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Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and
social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system,
different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no
concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree.
We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of
features that are widely associated with complex systems in the literature and by those
in the field. We argue that some of these features are neither necessary nor sufficient for
complexity, and that some of them are too vague or confused to be of any analytical use.
In order to bring mathematical rigour to the issue we then review some standard measures
of complexity from the scientific literature, and offer a taxonomy for them, before arguing
that the one that best captures the qualitative notion of the order produced by complex
systems is that of the Statistical Complexity. Finally, we offer our own list of necessary
conditions as a characterization of complexity. These conditions are qualitative and may
not be jointly sufficient for complexity. We close with some suggestions for future work.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of complexity is sometimes said to be part of a new unifying framework for science,
and a revolution in our understanding of systems the behaviour of which has proved difficult to
predict and control thus far, such as the human brain and the world economy. However, it is
important to ask whether there is such a thing as complexity science, rather than merely branches
of different sciences, each of which have to deal with their own examples of complex systems. In
other words: is there a single natural phenomenon called complexity, which is found in a variety
of physical (including living) systems, and which can be the subject of a single scientific theory,
or are the different examples of complex systems complex in ways that sometimes have nothing in
common?
Hence, the fundamental foundational question in the domain of the complexity sciences is: What
is complexity? Assuming that there is an answer to the latter question and that ‘complexity’ is not
2just an empty term, we should then ask more particularly whether there is one kind of complexity
for all the sciences or whether complexity is domain-specific?
In the next section, we review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider
a core set of features that are widely associated with complexity by scientists in the field. We argue
that some of these features are not necessary for complexity after all, and that some of them are
too vague or confused to be of an analytical use. In Section III we briefly discuss the connections
between complexity and probability and information, before explaining the Shannon entropy and
the algorithmic complexity, and arguing that neither is adequate as a measure of complexity.
Having introduced a distinction between ‘deterministic’ and ‘statistical’ complexity measures, in
Section IV we review some standard measures of complexity from the scientific literature. In
Section V we consider the popular idea that complexity lies between order and randomness and
argue that the one that best captures the qualitative notion of the order produced by complex
systems is that of the Statistical Complexity. In Section VI, we scrutinise the alleged necessity
and sufficiency of a number of conditions that have been proposed in the literature. We offer our
own list of necessary conditions for complexity. These conditions are qualitative and may not be
jointly sufficient for complexity. We then briefly discuss the very important idea of a hierarchy
of organization in complex systems and close with some suggestions for future work. We do not
arrive at a definition of a complex system in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions but
engage in explication of the notion of complex system, so that what is implicit in the science is
made more explicit though not completely so. We can hardly think of any important scientific
concepts that admit of an analysis into necessary and sufficient conditions but that ought not to
dissuade us from introducing such clarity and precision as we can.
II. COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND THEIR FEATURES
Complexity science has been comparatively little studied by analytic philosophers of science,
however, it has been widely discussed by social scientists and philosophers of social science. Rather
than begin our investigations with what they have said about it we think it best to start with what
practicing complexity scientists say about what a complex system is. The following quotations
(apart from the last one) come from a special issue of Science on “Complex Systems” featuring
many key figures in the field (Science 2 April 1999).
1. “To us, complexity means that we have structure with variations.”(18, p. 87)
2. “In one characterization, a complex system is one whose evolution is very sensitive to initial
3conditions or to small perturbations, one in which the number of independent interacting
components is large, or one in which there are multiple pathways by which the system
can evolve. Analytical descriptions of such systems typically require nonlinear differen-
tial equations. A second characterization is more informal; that is, the system is “compli-
cated” by some subjective judgment and is not amenable to exact description, analytical or
otherwise.”(52, p. 89)
3. “In a general sense, the adjective “complex” describes a system or component that by design
or function or both is difficult to understand and verify. [...] complexity is determined by
such factors as the number of components and the intricacy of the interfaces between them,
the number and intricacy of conditional branches, the degree of nesting, and the types of
data structures.”(50, p. 92)
4. “Complexity theory indicates that large populations of units can self-organize into aggrega-
tions that generate pattern, store information, and engage in collective decision-making.”(39,
p. 99)
5. “Complexity in natural landform patterns is a manifestation of two key characteristics. Nat-
ural patterns form from processes that are nonlinear, those that modify the properties of the
environment in which they operate or that are strongly coupled; and natural patterns form
in systems that are open, driven from equilibrium by the exchange of energy, momentum,
material, or information across their boundaries.” (51, p. 102)
6. “A complex system is literally one in which there are multiple interactions between many
different components.” (40, p. 105)
7. “Common to all studies on complexity are systems with multiple elements adapting or re-
acting to the pattern these elements create.” (2, p. 107)
8. “In recent years the scientific community has coined the rubric ‘complex system’ to describe
phenomena, structure, aggregates, organisms, or problems that share some common theme:
(i) They are inherently complicated or intricate [...]; (ii) they are rarely completely determin-
istic; (iii) mathematical models of the system are usually complex and involve non-linear,
ill-posed, or chaotic behavior; (iv) the systems are predisposed to unexpected outcomes
(so-called emergent behaviour).” (14, p. 410)
9. “Complexity starts when causality breaks down” (12)
4The last citation well illustrates the difficulties of this field. Clearly many people will have a suf-
ficiently permissive idea of causality to allow that there are causal relationships in complex systems,
indeed many people will claim that complexity science’s main job is to understand them. (1) may
be true but is hardly informative unless we define what we mean by structure and variations. (2)
asks us to choose between the conflation of complexity science with chaos and nonlinear dynamics,
or the conflation of complexity with having a lot of components, or the conflation of complexity
with a system with different possible histories on the one hand, and a completely subjective answer
to our question. (3) and (4) takes us to more interesting territory. The computational notions of
data structures, conditional branches and information processing are central to complexity science,
and they will be of central importance in Sections III, IV, and V. (5) introduces the central idea of
nonlinearity. We argue in the next section that while many complex systems are subject to nonlin-
ear dynamics, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for complexity. We endorse the
view of (6) and (7) that a system cannot be complex unless there are many components interacting
within it, but we argue this condition is not sufficient, and that it is of limited interest in so far
as it is left vague what ‘many’ means. (8) introduces the idea of emergence that we argue is too
confused to be part of an informative characterization of a complex system.
Abstracting from the quotations above and drawing on the culture of complexity science as
expressed through a wide range of popular as well as academic sources, we arrive at the following
list of properties associated with the idea of a complex system:
A. Nonlinearity
Nonlinearity is often considered to be essential for complexity. A system is linear if one can add
any two solutions to the equations that describe it and obtain another, and multiply any solution
by any factor and obtain another. Nonlinearity means that this superposition principle does not
apply.
The interesting consequences of nonlinearity are often when the divergence of the system from
the superposition principle is particularly extreme with respect to properties other than those
specified by the microstate: such as, for example, the property of being alive or dead of an organism
whose fate is determined by a nonlinear dynamical system like a skidding car. We often consider
systems where we take fine-grained states, such as the positions and momenta of particles for
example, as the inputs for dynamical equations, but we are really interested in the values of
physical quantities that are coarse-grained with respect to the microstate. Non-linearity in the
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conditions may make for radically different macrostates.1
In the popular and philosophical literature on complex systems a lot of heat and very little
light is liable to be generated by talk of linearity and non-linearity. For example, Klaus Mainzer
claims that “[l]inear thinking and the belief that the whole is only the sum of its parts are evidently
obsolete” (33, p. 1). It is not explained what is meant by linear thinking nor what non-linearity
has to do with the denial of ontological reductionism. Furthermore, an obvious response to this
kind of claim is to point out that it is perfectly possible to think in a linear way about systems
that exhibit non-linear dynamics. Unfortunately the discussion of complexity abounds with non-
sequiters involving nonlinearity. However, nonlinearity must be considered an important part of the
theory of complexity if there is to be one, since certainly many complex systems are also non-linear
systems.
Nonetheless, being subject to non-linear dynamics is not a necessary condition for a complex
system. For example, there are structures involving linear matrices that describe networks which
are a substantial part of what is studied by the complexity sciences; and there are complex systems
subject to game-theoretic and quantum dynamics all of which are subject to linear dynamics
(32). In general, feedback can give rise to complexity even in linear systems. Neither non-linear
dynamics or linear dynamics can be necessary conditions for complexity, since complexity scientists
also study static structures. One may of course argue that such a complex synchronic structure
could only come about through a dynamics that is nonlinear. This is the motivation for some of
the conceptions of complexity discussed in Section IV.
Non-linearity is also not sufficient for complexity not least because a simple system consisting
of say a single chaotic pendulum can be subject to non-linear dynamics but it is not a complex
system.
Complexity is often linked with chaos; and as noted above, it may be conflated with it. There are
systems that exhibit complexity in virtue of being chaotic. On the other hand, a completely chaotic
system is indistinguishable from one behaving randomly. Robert MacKay argues for a definition
of complexity as the study of systems with many interdependent components and excludes low-
dimensional dynamical systems (32) and hence many chaotic systems. Furthermore, since chaotic
behaviour is a special feature of some deterministic systems, any dynamical system that is stochastic
1 The relationship between macrostates and microstates is key to the complex sciences because very often what is
interesting about the system is the way that a stable causal structure arises that can be described at a higher level
than that of the properties of the parts (see Sec. II.E on emergence below).
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seems that chaos and nonlinearity are each of them neither necessary nor sufficient for complexity.2
However, we may suppose perhaps that in many cases non-linearity in some guise, usually as
of dynamics, is at least a necessary part of some set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for
complexity. (But there may be more than one such set.)
B. Feedback
Feedback is an important necessary condition for complex dynamical systems. A part of a
system receives feedback when the way its neighbours interact with it at a later time depends on
how it interacts with them at an earlier time. Consider a flock of birds. Each member of the
group takes a course that depends on the proximity and bearing of the birds around it, but after it
adjusts its course, its neighbours all change their flight plans in response in part to its trajectory;
so when it comes to plan its next move, its neighbours’ states now reflect in part its own earlier
behaviour.
The presence of feedback in a system is not sufficient for complexity because the individuals need
to be part of a large enough group to exhibit complexity, and because of how the feedback needs
to give rise to some kind of higher level order, such as, for example, the behaviour of ants who are
able to undertake complex tasks such as building bridges or farms even though no individual ant
has any idea what they are doing, and left to their own they will exhibit much simpler behaviour.
The ants behave as they do because of the way they interact with each other.
An abstract way of representing the prevalence of feedback in a complex system is provided by
the theory of causal graphs. A chain of causal arrows indicates no feedback while a graph with
loops of causal arrows shows feedback. In many contexts feedback is used by a control system, the
paradigm of which is the Watt steam regulator, where the speed of rotation of the device interacts
in a feedback loop with the steam engine to control the speed of the engine. However this is not
a complex system because it has a central controller who sets up the machine. Control theory
is importantly related to complexity theory because another central idea associated with complex
systems is that of order, organization and control that is distributed and locally generated (as with
the ants) rather than centrally produced (as with the steam regulator). Feedback can also be used
2 One anonymous referee claimed that it is not possible to define chaos, but on the contrary unlike complexity chaos
can readily be defined as systems that exhibit so-called strong mixing. Moreover, recently, Charlotte Werndl has
shown that there is a kind of unpredictability unique to chaos (2008). Note that chaos as in chaos theory is always
deterministic chaos.
7for error correction, for example, in motor systems in the brain. We return to this in Section II.D.
C. Spontaneous order
Given the above it is clear that a fundamental idea in complex systems research is that of order
in a system’s behaviour that arises from the aggregate of a very large number of uncoordinated
interactions between elements. However, it is far from easy to say what order is. Notions that are
related include symmetry, organization, periodicity, determinism and pattern. One of the most
confusing issues is how order in complex systems relates to the information content of states and
dynamics construed as information processing. The problem is that the interpretation of states
and processes as involving information may be argued to be of purely heuristic value and based on
observer-relative notions of information being projected onto the physical world. We return to the
role of information theory in answering our central questions in Section III. For now we note that
the notion of order may mean so many things that it must be carefully qualified if it is to be of any
analytical use in a theory of complex systems, but we note also that some such notion is central
because pure randomness is sufficient for no complexity whatsoever. On the other hand, total
order is also incompatible with complexity. The fact that complex systems are not random but
also not completely ordered is of central importance in what follows. Nonetheless, it is a necessary
condition for a complex system that it exhibit some kind of spontaneous order.
D. Robustness and lack of central control
The order in complex systems is said to be robust because, being distributed and not centrally
produced, it is stable under perturbations of the system. For example, the order observed in
the way a flock of birds stay together despite the individual and erratic motions of its members
is stable in the sense that the buffeting of the system by the wind or the random elimination
of some of the members of the flock does not destroy it. A centrally controlled system on the
other hand is vulnerable to the malfunction of a few key components. Clearly, while lack of
central control is always a feature of complex systems it is not sufficient for complexity since non-
complex systems may have no control or order at all. A system may maintain its order in part by
utilizing an error-correction mechanism (we return to this in Section II.D). Robustness seems to
be necessary but not sufficient for complexity because a random system can be said to be robust
in the trivial sense that perturbations do not affect its order because it doesn’t have any. A good
example of robustness is the climatic structure of the Earth’s weather where rough but relatively
8stable regularities and periodicities in the basic phenomena of wind velocity, temperature, pressure
and humidity arise from an underlying non-linear dynamic. Note that these latter properties are
coarse-grainings relative to the underlying state-space. That such properties exist and enable us
to massively reduce the number of degrees of freedom that we need to consider is the subject of
the next section.
Note that robustness may be formulated in computational language as the ability of a system to
correct errors in its structure. In communication theory error correction is achieved by introducing
some form of redundancy. This redundancy need not be explicit such as a copy of the string
or its parts. It may be more subtle, for instance, exploiting parity checking (13) which is more
computationally intensive but also more efficient (the message is shorter) than simple duplication.
In his account of complexity discussed in Section IV.A.1 Charles Bennett specifically mentions
error correction:
“Irreversibility seems to facilitate complex behavior by giving noisy systems the generic
ability to correct errors.”
The situation can be viewed like this: A living cell is arguably a paradigm complex object
and does indeed have the ability to repair itself (correct errors), for instance a malfunctioning
component may be broken down and released into the surrounding medium. Contrast the cell with
a non-complex object such as a gas in a box, a small perturbation of this gas is rapidly dispersed
with no limitations to the many billions of degrees of freedom within the gas. The cell on the
other hand has a one-way direction for this dispersal, errors within the cell are transported out,
and errors outside the cell are kept out (assuming, in both cases, the errors are sufficiently small).
E. Emergence
Emergence is a notoriously murky notion with a long history in the philosophy of science. People
talking about complexity science often associate it with the limitations of reductionism. A strong,
perhaps the strongest, notion of emergence is that emergent objects, properties or processes exhibit
something called ’downwards causation’. Upwards causation is uncontroversial in the following
sense: a subatomic decay event may produce radiation that induces a mutation in a cell that in
turn causes the death of an organism. The biological, chemical, economic and social worlds are not
causally closed with respect to physics: economic effects may have physical causes. On the other
hand, many people take it that the physical world is causally closed in the sense that all physical
9effects have physical causes. This immediately raises the question as to how complexity relates
to physicalism, and whether the latter is understood in terms of causal completeness or merely in
terms of some kind of weak asymmetric supervenience of everything on the physical.
There is a sense in which approximately elliptical orbits emerge over time from the gravitational
interaction between the sun and the planets. This is not the notion of emergence at issue here.
Rather we are concerned with the kind of emergence exemplified by the formation of crystals, the
organisation of ant colonies; and in general, the way that levels of organisation in nature emerge
from fundamental physics and physical parts of more complex systems. There is much controversy
about how this happens and about its implications. Again we conclude that the notion of emergence
would need to be very precisely characterized to avoid simply adding to our confusion about the
nature of complex systems. Indeed, it is attractive to define emergence in terms of increase in
complexity, and so it is preferable not to use the concept in the definition of complexity itself as
both concepts seem to be at a similar level of generality.
Emergence is either purely epistemological, in which case it can be strong or weak depending
on whether the lack of reduction is in principle or merely in practice; or it is ontological. In its
latter form no consensus exists about how to understand it; although it is truistic to say that there
is a very important sense in which the physical interaction of atoms and molecules with light and
electricity and magnetism and all other physical entities have led to the emergence of the immensely
complex and structured system of life on earth including the human brain and the complexity of
human culture and social life. Unless one is prepared to say with some metaphysicians that all
this enjoys only some kind of second class existence or even none at all, then it seems one must
embrace ontological emergence in some sense. The problem then is with resisting or avoiding the
argument that one’s position requires that one accept downwards causation on pain of making
most of reality causally inert or abstract rather than concrete. While non-reductive physicalism
without the violation of physicalism may be defensible these issues are not to be solved en passant
in characterizing complexity. Certainly we must say that emergence in all epistemological senses is
necessary for complex systems. If a system doesn’t exhibit higher-level order as discussed above,
then it is not complex. However, emergence is not sufficient because, for example, an ideal gas
exhibits emergent order but is not a complex system.
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F. Hierarchical organisation
In complex systems there are often many levels of organization that can be thought of as forming
a hierarchy of system and sub-system as proposed by Herbert Simon in his paper ‘The Architecture
of Complexity’ (46). Emergence occurs because order that arises from interactions among parts
at a lower level is robust. It should be noted of course that such robustness is only ever within a
particular regime; the interactions among our neurons generate an emergent order of cognition but
only in an operating temperature range of up to 5 degrees Celsius above its normal temperature.
The ultimate result of all the features of complex systems above is an entity that is organized
into a variety of levels of structure and properties that interact with the level above and below
and exhibit lawlike and causal regularities, and various kinds of symmetry, order and periodic
behaviour. The best example of such a system is an ecosystem or the whole system of life on
Earth. Other systems that display such organization include individual organisms, the brain, the
cells of complex organisms and so on. A non-living example of such organization is the cosmos
itself with its complex structure of atoms, molecules, gases, liquids, chemical kinds and geological
kinds, and ultimately stars and galaxies, and clusters and superclusters.
G. Numerosity
Philip Anderson in his paper about complexity ‘More is Different’ (1) famously argues against
reductionism and also emphasises the importance of considering hierarchies of structure and or-
ganisation to understand complex systems as just discussed. His title alludes to the fact that many
more than a handful of individual elements need to interact in order to generate complex systems.
The kind of hierarchical organization that emerges and gives rise to all the features we have dis-
cussed above, only exists if the system consists of a large number of parts, and usually, only if they
are engaged in many interactions. We call this numerosity and return to it in Section VI.
H. Remarks
The above discussion makes it clear that the definition of complexity and complex systems
is not straightforward and is potentially philosophically interesting. The notions of order and
organization introduced above and the idea of feedback are suggestive of an information-theoretic
approach to complexity, since complex systems can be often helpfully be construed as maintaining
their order and hierarchical organization by the exchange of information among their parts. Many
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people think that it is fruitful to think of complex systems as characterized by the way they process
information, as well as by the information-theoretic properties of the data we obtain by sampling
them. Since the notion of information is itself a philosophically problematic one, in the next section
we explain the fundamentals of information theory so as to approach a mathematical theory of
complexity.
III. COMPLEXITY, INFORMATION, AND PROBABILITY
Complex systems are often characterized in information-theoretic terms. This is based on
the idea that the order of a complex system can be understood as maintained by the internal
processing of information. Whether or not it makes sense to talk about physical systems containing
and processing information independently of our representations of them is a vexed issue. It has
recently been argued by Chris Timpson in the context of quantum information theory that talk
of information flowing in a system is based on a confusion between abstract and concrete nouns
(47). His view is that information is not a physical quantity. On the other hand, there are radical
proposals such as that popularized by the great physicist John Wheeler to take information as the
primitive “component” of reality from which other physical properties are derived. We will not
take a stand on these issues here but rather address the question of whether or not the standard
measure of information content can be used to measure complexity. We remain neutral about the
ontological status of information itself and in particular about how if at all information theory
relates to the semantic conception of information.
Claude Shannon was the first to formalise the statistical reliability of communication channels
and from an engineering perspective invented a measure of information that can be applied to any
probability distribution. Hence, Shannon information theory is closely connected with probability
theory.
Another way to define information comes from algorithmic complexity theory. It is based on
the concepts of computing machines and programmes with input and output. Here, the size of a
programme which runs on a universal computing machine and generates a particular output is a
measure of information (of that output).
We will review both definitions of information and their use in devising measures of complexity.
Most importantly we will in the following point out how they both in their original form measure
randomness rather than complexity (or structure).
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A. Shannon entropy
Claude Shannon was concerned with quantifying information of a message so he could devise an
optimal method for sending it over a communication channel. He writes: “Frequently the messages
have meaning; [...] These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering
problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible
messages.” (45, p.1) The Shannon entropy is a measure of the probability distribution over the
messages only and is not concerned with the content of the messages. Loosely speaking, the
Shannon entropy is higher the more uniform the probability distribution; it reaches its maximum
when all messages have the same probability. Formulating the following three axioms Shannon
showed that there is a unique function H which satisfies them (up to a multiplicative constant),
see Eq. 1 (45, p.49). Consider a probability distribution Pr(X) = {Pr(x1),Pr(x2), . . . ,Pr(xn)}
1. H should be continuous in the probabilities Pr(xi).
2. If all the probabilities Pr(xi) are equal, Pr(xi) =
1
n , then H should be a monotonic increasing
function of n.
3. If the choice [of xi] is broken down into two successive choices, the original H should be the
weighted sum of the individual values of H.
The resulting unique function H, now called the Shannon entropy, is formally defined for a
random variable X as follows, with probability distribution Pr(X) and alphabet X 3 x, where the
alphabet corresponds to the “messages”:
H(X) := −
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log Pr(x) . (1)
The log is usually taken to the base 2. One can see that Shannon entropy is a measure of
randomness of a probability distribution by considering the example of tossing a coin. The coin
represents a binary random variable. If the coin is fair it has maximum entropy (H(X) = 1 bit),
each outcome is equally likely. In contrast, when the coin has probability of heads equal to, say
0.9 and that of tails equal to 0.1, it has much lower entropy (H(X) = 0.47 bit), its outcomes are
less random or, equally significant, more predictable.
Because Shannon entropy is a function of a probability distribution it does not measure infor-
mation of a single object (unless this object is characterised by a trivial probability distribution
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in which case it has zero Shannon entropy). Instead, Shannon entropy measures the information
of one object out of a set in the sense of the amount of “surprise” when this message is selected;
“surprise” is inversely proportional to its probability.
B. Kolmogorov complexity
Shannon entropy cannot express the notion of randomness, order, or complexity of a single
object. It can only express properties of a total set of sequences under some distribution. Combining
notions of computability and statistics one can express the complexity of a single object. This
complexity is the length of the shortest binary programme from which the object can be effectively
reconstructed (see e.g. (29)). It is known as algorithmic complexity or Kolmogorov complexity and
was formulated independently by Solomonoff, Kolmogorov and Chaitin in the mid-sixties (25; 26).
It has been claimed to be more fundamental than information theory in so far as a key result of
the latter can be derived from it (26).
It is easiest to think in terms of binary strings and to associate every object (numbers, vectors,
lists, etc) with a string that describes it. In the case of numbers this will no doubt be just the
binary expansion of the number, in the case of a list it might be the ASCII code. The algorithmic
complexity of a random string, for example, is the length of the string itself (plus a constant
independent of the string). Any repetition of digits or symmetry in the string will allow the
programme that outputs the string to be shorter than the string itself. The more compressible the
string is the shorter is the programme. A random sequence is maximally incompressible while a
string of all zeros, say, is maximally compressible. It is important that the algorithmic-complexity
measure is independent of the source of the string. For example, a string of apparently random
numbers might in fact have been generated from the decimal expansion of pi according to some
rule, but its Kolmogorov complexity will be maximal because nothing in the string itself tells us
where to find it in the decimal expansion of pi and hence we are unable to use the latter as a
shortcut to outputting the string.
The concept of algorithmic complexity discussed so far does not allow for the difficulty of running
the progamme and generating its output. In particular we will want to consider the amount of
time it takes for the programme to generate its output. This is called the running time or “time
complexity” of the programme. We will get back to this in the Section IV.A.1.
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1. Lempel-Ziv complexity
From a practical point of view it is important to note that the Kolmogorov complexity is
uncomputable. As a way to approximate the Kolmogorov complexity, Lempel and Ziv invented an
algorithm for compressing a sequence by taking advantage of repetitions of a specified maximum
length in the sequence (see e.g. (6)). The length of the resulting programme is considered to
be a good estimator of the Kolmogorov complexity for many practical purposes. The Lempel-Ziv
complexity is defined as the ratio of the length of the programme and the length of the original
sequence.
C. Deterministic versus statistical conceptions of complexity
One of the most intriguing ideas is that complexity lies between order and randomness. The
latter two notions are here meant in the sense of algorithmic complexity theory. Systems of interest
to complexity scientists are neither completely ordered nor completely random. Neither entirely
ordered, nor entirely random processes qualify as ‘complex’ in the intuitive sense since both admit
of concise descriptions. Ordered processes produce data that exhibit repetitive patterns describe
the string ‘0101 . . . 0101 consisting of 1000 bits concisely as:
‘01’ 500 times
Whereas random ‘noise’ such as the outcomes of 1000 coin-toss trials, while lacking periodic
structure, affords a concise statistical description:
‘0’ with probability 0.5, ‘1’ otherwise
What is needed then would seem to be a measure of complexity different from the algorith-
mic complexity and we make this argument more explicit below. We first note that measures of
complexity may be deterministic or statistical in the following sense. A deterministic measure of
complexity treats a completely random sequence of 0s and 1s as having maximal complexity. Cor-
respondingly a statistical measure of complexity treats a completely random sequence as having
minimal complexity. Although the Shannon entropy is a function over a probability distribution
and the algorithmic complexity is a function of an instantiation, both are deterministic in the above
sense.
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If we are interested in a measure that tells us when we are dealing with a complex physical
system we clearly do not want a measure that is maximal for completely random data strings.
Note also that the algorithmic complexity and the Shannon entropy of the data produced by a
biased coin would be lower than that of a fair coin although there is no sense in which the former
is more complex that the latter. Both functions are monotonically increasing with randomness
whereas we want a function that is unimodal and peaked between randomness and complete order.
Hence, neither Shannon entropy nor algorithmic complexity of a data string are an appropriate
measure for the complexity of a physical system. We need a measure that is statistical in the
sense defined above.3 In the next section we review some important measures of complexity in
the literature. Note that such measures of complexity may be applied to three targets, namely,
to the methods used to study certain systems, to data that are obtained from certain systems,
or to the systems themselves. Some say that the complex sciences are simply those that use
certain characteristic methods. In this view it makes little or no sense to speak of complex data
sets or complex systems. Call this a pragmatic account of complexity. We set this point of view
aside. At the other extreme, some measures of complexity are supposed to be applied directly to
systems to tell us whether they are complex or not. Call this a physical account of complexity.
Among physical accounts of complexity are the theories of Logical Depth, Thermodynamic Depth
and Effective Complexity reviewed in Sections IV.A.1, IV.A.2, and IV.B.1. These views allow
for derivative notions of complex data (the data produced by complex physical systems), and
complex methods (the methods appropriate to studying such systems). Finally, a third kind of
account of complexity applies primarily to data and derivatively to physical systems and to the
methods appropriate to their study. Call this a data account of complexity. Among data accounts
of complexity are the Statistical Complexity and the Effective Measure Complexity reviewed in
Sections IV.B.2 and IV.B.3.
IV. MEASURES OF COMPLEXITY
Before reviewing several measures of complexity from the literature we consider the following
categorisation suggested by Seth Lloyd on conditions for a good measure of complexity:
“Three questions that are frequently posed when attempting to quantify the complex-
3 Note that we are not here talking about whether the system that produces the data is deterministic or not. Of
course, the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution is insensitive to whether that probability distribution
was produced by deterministic or an indeterministic system. Our point is just that a good measure of complexity
will not be maximal for random data strings.
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ity of the thing [...] under study are 1) How hard is it to describe? 2) How hard is it
to create? 3) What is its degree of organization?” (30)[p. 7]
Lloyd continues to categorise measures of complexity into three different groups according to
whether they measure the difficulty of description, the difficulty of creation, or the degree of or-
ganisation. Examples of measures of difficulty of description are the measures in the previous
Section III – entropy and algorithmic complexity. In this section we will look at some proposed
measures of the difficulty of creation and degree of organisation. We adopt Lloyd’s classification
because it illustrates some of the differences. Note that it is similar to our tripartite distinction of
Section III.C in so far as the complexity of the data (the product) corresponds to the difficulty of
description, and the complexity of the system corresponds to the difficulty of creation. Of course,
these degrees of difficulty are related in so far as there is a correlation between how hard things
are to create and how hard they are to describe; for example, a living organism is both difficult
to create and to describe. On the other hand, some things that are easy to describe are difficult
to create such as for example a perfectly spherical and homogenous ball. So the relations among
them are not straightforward.
A. Difficulty of Creation
“Such a measure [...] should assign low complexity to systems in random states and
in ordered but regular states [...]. Complexity is then a measure of how hard it is to
put something together.” (31)[p. 189]
This quote, again from Lloyd, suggests that it might be possible to define and measure the
complexity of a system by considering its history. This is the approach taken by Bennett with his
measure of Logical Depth (4), as well as by Lloyd and Pagels (31) with their notion of Thermody-
namic Depth.
We now look at these measures in some more detail.
1. Logical Depth
1. Complex objects lie somewhere between complete order and complete disorder.
2. Complex or logically deep objects cannot be produced quickly so any adequate complexity
measure should obey a slow growth law.
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3. The history of a complex object is not only long, but non-trivial, that is, the most plausible
explanation for the object’s origin is one that entails a lengthy computation/causal process.
A book on Number Theory might seem very difficult or “deep”. However, it has very low
Kolmogorov complexity, all of its theorems and proofs follow from a few axioms. Clearly, this does
not capture our sense of difficulty which is based on the experience that it takes a long time to
reproduce all these theorems and proofs. A proper definition of the “depth” of an object is going
to be a compromise between the programme size and computation time.
Charles Bennett’s approach to finding a measure of this “depth” begins with the intuition that
some objects, such as, for example, the human body contain “internal evidence of a non-trivial
causal history” (4, p. 227). He formalizes the idea of an object that has such a history in the
language of algorithmic information theory. Bennett’s key idea is that long causal processes are
usually necessary in order to produce complex or ‘deep’ objects; deep objects are produced by
short processes only with very low probability.
Suppose, following William Paley (37, p. 7-8), you find a pocket watch on a deserted heath,
and consider all possible explanations for the watch’s presence. Some explanations will involve a
watchmaker who, after training for many years finally manufactures the watch in question, plus
some further story about how the watch came to be on the heath, such as that the chain snapped
while the owner was out walking. However, other explanations could be altogether more unusual,
for instance, perhaps the moment you set foot on the heath the impact of your foot caused atoms
in the sand grains to leap into the exact configuration of a pocket watch awaiting your discovery.
Intuitively some of these explanations are more plausible than others. Bennett’s intuition is that
complex objects are those whose most plausible explanations describe long causal processes, and
that hypothesising the objects to have had a more rapid origin forces one to adopt drastically less
plausible stories. Here ‘explanation’ means a complete description of the object’s entire causal
history.
Bennett’s challenge now is to say exactly how we grade various causal histories in terms of plau-
sibility; why is the watchmaker hypothesis a better explanation than the springing-into-existence
hypothesis? To this end Bennett turns to algorithmic information theory. Bennett proposes that
the shortest programme for generating a string represents the a-priori most plausible description
of its origin, while a ‘print’ program on the other hand offers no explanation whatsoever, and is
equivalent to saying ‘it just happened’ and so is effectively a null-hypothesis. If we view ad-hocness
in an hypothesis as the use of arbitrary unsupported assertions that could or should be explained
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by a more detailed theory, then a hypothesis represented by a programme s-bits longer than the
minimal programme is said to suffer from s-bits of ‘ad-hocness’ when compared with the hypothesis
represented by the minimal programme.
The Logical Depth of the system then, represented as a string, is dependent on the running time
of the programmes that produce it. Bennet’s example of the digits of pi illustrates the difference
between algorithmically complex and logically ‘deep’. A ‘print’ programme has high algorithmic
complexity but is logically very ‘shallow’ because it runs very fast. Whereas an algorithm which
computes the digits of pi is a comparatively short programme but which has a longer running time.
The former would constitute a lot of ‘ad-hocness’ while the latter is based on a theory. Bennett
defines Logical Depth as follows:
Logical Depth A string x is d, b deep [...] if and only if d is the least time needed by a b-
incompressible program to print x. (from (29, p.512))
Logical Depth seems to be a reasonably measure of the difficulty of creation and to that extent
is a good measure of complexity. In terms of our threefold distinction at the end of Section III.C
it is applied to the system itself and so may be thought of as a physical measure. However, the
Logical Depth is not computable because it is defined in terms of the algorithmic complexity which
is provably non-computable. We argue at the end Section IV.C that this makes it unfit for purpose.
We also argue in Section V that one of Bennett’s motivating intuitions for his definition of Logical
Depth, namely that complexity is maximal for systems that are neither completely ordered nor
completely random is misleading despite its initial appeal and popularity among commentators.
2. Thermodynamic Depth
The notion of Thermodynamic Depth introduced by Seth Lloyd and Heinz Pagels (31) shares
much of its informal motivation with Logical Depth.
“ [Complexity] is a property of the evolution of a state and not of the state itself, it
vanishes for ordered and disordered states, it is a universal, physical quantity, and it
corresponds to mathematical complexity in problem solving. (31, p.187) ”
Their description of complexity is motivated by the fact that Lloyd and Pagels do not consider
multiple copies of a complex object to be significantly more complex than a single complex object,
since, as they point out, producing a single specimen of a plant takes billions of years of evolution,
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but seven more specimens of the same plant can be easily produced with a single one. The process
from no specimens to several is only minutely harder than the process from none to one. Putting
aside concerns about the biological possibility of a single specimen in isolation, the idea, much like
Bennett’s, is that complexity has something to do with how difficult it is to produce something.
Lloyd and Pagels introduce three requirements that any reasonable measure of complexity de-
fined over these trajectories should obey. (1) The function must be continuous in the probabilities,
(2) if all trajectories are equally likely then the measure should be monotonically increasing in n,
the number of trajectories, and (3) additivity: the measure associated with going from state a to
b to c should be equal to the sum of the measures for going from a to b and from b to c. In other
words the complexity of building a car from scratch is the complexity of building the components
from scratch and building the car from the components.
These are effectively the same demands made by Shannon on the entropy function (see Sec. ??).
It will therefore not come as a surprise later on that Thermodynamic Depth is not a measure of
order as it claims to be but a measure of randomness.
Like Bennett, Lloyd and Pagels consider the set of histories or trajectories that result in the
object in question. A trajectory is an ordered set of macroscopic states ai, bj . . . ck. If we are
interested in the complexity of a state d, then we consider all trajectories which end in a state in
d and their probabilities.
The depth of state d is determined by the probability of the trajectory ai, bj . . . ck . . . d by which
it was reached:
D (d) = −k ln Pr (ai, bj . . . ck . . . d) . (2)
where k is an arbitrary constant which is set equal to the Boltzmann constant to make the
connection between information theory and statistical mechanics.
How the probabilities are to be interpreted is unclear but Lloyd and Pagels reject a subjective
reading.
“ [A]lthough the complexity depends on the set of experiments that determine how
a system reaches a given state, the measure as defined is not subjective: two dif-
ferent physicists given the same experimental data will assign the state the same
complexity.”(31, p. 190)
Because their discussion draws heavily on concepts from statistical mechanics, such as those of
phase spaces, microscopic/macroscopic states and so on, it is reasonable to suppose the probabilities
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used in defining a system’s depth are of the same sort as those found in statistical mechanics. But
the correct interpretation of these probabilities is still controversial with some prominent authors,
notably Jaynes (23; 24), arguing for a purely epistemic interpretation. If the biggest problems
Thermodynamic Depth faces were those it inherits from statistical mechanics then Lloyd and
Pagels could be relieved because, while statistical mechanics faces many philosophical problems
like most (if not all) successful physical theories, the subject has hardly been brought down by them.
However, bigger problems are highlighted by Crutchfield and Shalizi (8). First we are not told how
long the trajectories we consider should be. Complexity is claimed to be a property of a process
but how do we identify when a process starts? To remedy this Crutchfield and Shalizi suggest
looking at the rate at which depth increases, rather than its absolute value. The rate of increase of
depth turns out to be the rate at which the system’s entropy increases. Entropy rate, however, is a
measure of randomness and does not capture complexity in the here desired way. This renders the
Thermodynamic Depth itself unsuitable as a measure of complexity. Lloyd and Pagels specifically
state that a reasonable complexity measure should not award high complexity to a purely random
process but Thermodynamic Depth does exactly this. An N body Ising spin system being cooled
below its critical temperature assumes a frozen magnetic state ‘up’,‘down’. . . which has very many
probable predecessors which results in a very large Thermodynamic Depth of this frozen state
again showing that it is not a good measure of complexity.
B. Degree of Organisation
1. Effective complexity
“A measure that corresponds [...] to what is usually meant by complexity [...] refers
not to the length of the most concise description of an entity [...], but to the length of
a concise description of a set of the entity’s regularities.” (15, p.2)
Effective complexity, introduced by Murray Gell-Mann (15; 17) (see also (16)), is a statistical
measure based on the (deterministic) Kolmogorov complexity. To find the complexity of an object
Gell-Mann considers the shortest description, not of the entity itself, but of the ensemble in which
the entity is embedded as a typical member. Here, ‘typical’ means that the negative logarithm
of its probability is approximately equal to the entropy of the ensemble. This assumes ways of
estimating what the ensemble is. The Kolmogorov complexity (Gell-Mann uses the equivalent term
algorithmic information content) of the ensemble is the length of the shortest programme required
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to list all members of the ensemble together with their probabilities.
The resulting definition of Effective Complexity of an object (represented as a string) is the algo-
rithmic information content of the ensemble in which the string is embedded. Effective complexity
is designed to measure the regularities of a string as opposed to the length of a concise description.
This makes Effective Complexity a measure of degree of organisation as opposed to difficulty of
description. The problem with this measure, as with Logical Depth, it that it is not computable,
as Gell-Man states himself: “There can exist no procedure for finding the set of all regularities of
an entity.” (15, p. 2). From a conceptual point of view, however, it is consistent with the above
discussed notions of complexity. A random string is assigned zero Effective Complexity. Maybe
more surprising, the digits of pi have very low Effective Complexity.
Logical Depth vs Effective Complexity
Gell-Man argues that Logical Depth and Effective Complexity are complementary quantities.
The Effective Complexity of a set of data might be very high such as a detailed diagram of the
Mandelbrot set until we learn that it can be computed from a very simple formula and so its
Logical Depth is the determining factor to understand it rather than its Effective Complexity.
It is often not clear whether something which is apparently complex is really the combination
of an underlying simplicity and a certain amount of Logical Depth. Gell-Mann argues against
Logical Depth being responsible for the intricateness of structure observed in nature calling on
the “relentless operation of chance”. These chance events Gell-Man attributes to the inherent
probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. The resulting Effective Complexity of the universe is
a result of many “frozen accidents” accumulating over time generating the many regularities we
observe today rather than a predetermined algorithm with a large Logical Depth.
2. Effective Measure Complexity
“Quantities which qualify as measures of complexity of patterns [...] (1) they are
measure-theoretic concepts, more closely related to Shannon entropy than to compu-
tational complexity; and (2) they are observables related to ensembles of patterns, not
to individual patterns. Indeed, they are essentially Shannon information needed to
specify not individual patterns, but either measure-theoretic or algebraic properties
of ensembles of patterns arising in a priori translationally invariant situations.” (19,
p.907)
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Introduced by Peter Grassberger, the Effective Measure Complexity (EMC) is measuring the
average amount by which the uncertainty of a symbol in a string is decreasing due to knowledge of
previous symbols (19). For a completely random string the measure is zero since no information
is gained about one random symbol by looking at another random symbol. The more statistical
dependencies there are, i.e. the more order there is, the larger the Effective Measure Complexity
is going to be. The mathematical definition is based on the Shannon entropy (Eq. 1). For strings
xN of length N H(XN ) is the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution Pr(xN ) (replacing
Pr(x) in Eq. 1). Considering strings of length N + 1 from the same system one can define the
increase in entropy as the difference H(XN+1)−H(XN ) and call this entropy rate hN . The limit
for N →∞ exists under certain assumptions and is denoted by h. The entropy rate is a measure
of persistent randomness which can not be eliminated by observing the system over a long time or
space. It is randomness inherent to the system. Grassberger then defines the Effective Measure
Complexity as the accumulated difference between the “believed” entropy rate hN and the “true”
entropy rate h.
EMC =
∞∑
N=0
(hN − h) . (3)
This difference quantifies the perceived randomness which, after further observation, is discovered
to be order. The more observations are required to identify this order the higher the Effective
Measure Complexity.
3. The Statistical Complexity
“The idea is that a data set is complex if it is the composite of many symmetries.”
(10, p.227).
“When we use the word ’complexity’ we mean degrees of pattern, not degrees of
randomness.” (42, p.824)
The Statistical Complexity was introduced by James Crutchfield and Karl Young to measure
information processing of nonlinear dynamical systems (7; 9). Behind this measure lies a technique
of causal-state reconstruction further developed by Crutchfield and Cosma Shalizi (42). From
either empirical data or from a probabilistic description of behaviour one infers a model of the
hidden process that generated the observed behaviour .
The inference proceeds as follows. From empirical data probabilities for successive observations
conditioned on previous observations are gathered. Possible such paths (sequences of observation
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types) are put into the same equivalence class when they have the same conditional probability
for future observations. The resulting sets each define predictions for future observations and,
hence, each constitute a regularity. Note that this procedure applied to a sequence of coin flips
with an unbiased coin would result in merely one set containing the probabilities of observing
a head or a tail conditioned on any previous observation which is 1/2 and independent on the
previous observations. What we have put here in layman’s terms is the construction of a so-called
“minimal sufficient statistic”, a well-known concept in the statistics literature. Crutchfield and
Shalizi introduced the term causal states following Hume’s weak sense of causality: “one class of
event causes another if the latter always follows the former” (42, p.824). This set of causal states
S and probabilistic transitions between them, summarised in the so-called -machine,
represents our ability to predict the process’s future behaviour. And it is the minimal and
optimal such representation (42). The mathematical structure of the -machine is that of a hidden
Markov model or stochastic finite-state automaton. The Statistical Complexity, denoted Cµ, is
then the Shannon entropy over the stationary distribution over the causal states S:
Cµ = H(S) (4)
Hence, the Statistical Complexity is derivative quantity of the -machine which in itself contains
all the available information about the process’s organisation. For a system to have high Statistical
Complexity it must have a large number of causal states and hence a large amount of regularities.
Successful applications of the causal-state reconstruction technique to complex systems range from
protein configuration (28) and atmospheric turbulence (38) to self-organisation (44).
While the Kolmogorov complexity (see Section III.B) and Thermodynamic Depth (see Section
IV.A.2) award random strings high complexity; the former by defining a random string as one
whose minimal program is approximately the length of the string itself, the latter by measuring a
systems rate of change of entropy, the Statistical Complexity awards zero complexity to random
strings and high complexity to strings with many statistical dependencies.
Bennett considers the computational resources (programme size, space-time complexity etc.)
needed to reproduce the given string verbatim. In contrast Crutchfield’s approach is to consider
the simplest computational model capable reproducing the statistical properties of the string. In
this sense the Statistical Complexity is a data-driven account of complexity.
24
C. Computable versus non-computable measures
In this section it is argued that only computable measures are suitable as measures for the
complexity of a physical system.
A good measure of complexity needs to be statistical as opposed to deterministic. This rules out
Thermodynamic Depth and leaves us with Effective Complexity, Logical Depth, Effective Measure
Complexity, and Statistical Complexity. If we, in addition, impose computability as a requirement,
which seems reasonable in so far as we are interested in using our measure of complexity to tell
us which systems in the world are complex, then among the measures we have considered we
are left with Effective Measure Complexity and Statistical Complexity as the ones that meet
both requirements of being computable and statistical. Note, that Effective Measure Complexity
is always bounds from below the Statistical Complexity of any give process (42, Theorem 5).
Furthermore, as we have outlined above, with the Statistical Complexity we have access to not
only a measure of the degree of organisation but also to a description of that organisation. Hence,
we come to the conclusion that the measure that best captures the qualitative notion of the order
produced by complex systems is that of the Statistical Complexity.
The Statistical Complexity is applied to data sets, as opposed to systems or to methods. A
data set with a high Statistical Complexity is not necessarily produced by a complex system. For
example, highly structured data may be produced by a centralised control mechanism rather than
by emergence. However, when looking at large data sets gathered from real world systems, high
Statistical Complexity is probably produced by complex systems. In principle, there is no reason
to suppose that there could not be some true property of systems that measures their complexity
even though we cannot compute it. However, since the Statistical Complexity can be computed
and used in practice to infer the presence of complex systems, it is the best candidate we have
considered for a measure of the order produced by complex systems.
D. Remarks
We have not argued exhaustively by considering every putative measure of complexity in the
literature, rather we have taken a representative sample of complexity measures and considered at
least one that falls into each of the four categories of measure generated by our two binary dis-
tinctions among different kinds of measure. We have not attempted an exhaustive survey of such
measures, since, that would be a Herculean task that would take up a whole long paper in itself,
so we offer only a guide to further reading. A discussion of complexity measures in the context of
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dynamical systems can be found in (48). In it the authors suggest a classification scheme of dynam-
ical systems into four categories similar to the scheme presented here. The scheme distinguishes
between order and chaos using the notions of generating and homogeneous partitions. A discussion
of complexity measures in the context of physical systems can be found in (3). This book surveys
different kinds of complex system and measures of complexity. Of the ones, mentioned there the
Grammatical Complexity deserves mentioning. Opposed to the statistical measures reviewed so far
Grammatical Complexity is concerned with higher level organisation while discarding finite-length
correlations as not complex. Hence, it is worth considering as a measure when the investigator is
interested in higher-level order and infinite correlations. A survey of measures of complexity and
their criticism can be found in (20). In it the author concludes that no unified measure can be
found nor should there be one since complexity is intricately linked to meaning which is subjective
and unmeasurable.
V. THE “PEAKED” COMPLEXITY FUNCTION
It is generally agreed upon that a complex system is structured. One thing that seems certain
is that complex systems are not ones in which all the parts are performing random walks, and
this is enough to distinguish complexity from just “being complicated”. A gas at equilibrium is
an incredibly complicated system but it is not complex just because the behaviour of its parts is
effectively random in the sense that the behaviours of individual molecules are largely uncorrelated.
However, the one point of agreement in the complex-systems community is that a measure of
complexity should assign its highest value to systems which are neither completely random nor
completely ordered. Usually this is justified by giving examples which are intuitively not complex.
At the random end of this scale a sequence of coin flips or an ideal gas are often mentioned. At
the ordered end of the scale a perfect crystal or a checker board pattern are examples. Following
this logic one would have to assume that a disordered crystal would score higher in complexity
than a perfect crystal. Equally if we start to insert random bits into a string of ones we get a
more “complex” sequence. This form of randomness in order does not seem to capture what we
mean when we call a cell complex or when we consider a bee hive complex. Of course, the latter
are mostly complex because of their dynamics not because of their static structure. A pattern in
the sand on a beach might be considered complex because it has many regularities and yet is not
perfectly symmetric. The reason it is complex is not because it is imperfect but rather because such
regular patterns form no matter how the wind blows. So there is an interplay between regularities
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and a form of robustness which is important here.
What is the reason for randomness to be stated as a necessary ingredient by so many authors?
An answer to this is given by Edgar Morin in his treatise “Method” (36). In his view the role of
randomness is crucial to generate and sustain complexity. To summarise his view in our terms:
Complexity could “be” without randomness, but it could not become nor sustain itself; randomness
acts as a source of interaction which is necessary for the build-up of correlations. Because of the
second law of thermodynamics, however, these correlations will decohere and the initial random
state will be populated once more. Only, if there is a balance between random encounters and,
literally, constructive interactions can decoherence be avoided and order maintained. Thus, there
is no complex system which is static. Complex systems are in a continuous process of maintaining
their complexity. And hence randomness and order are intricately linked to complexity.
Careful investigation shows that the Statistical Complexity does increase monotonically with
the orderliness of the system4. Hence, it is a good measure of structure, even in the presence of
noise, but it does not indicate any of the other features of a complex system such as robustness
and adaptivity. The ubiquitous single-humped curve as the “ideal measure” of complexity (zero
for perfect order and zero for complete randomness) is not fulfilled by the Statistical Complexity,
since it has a maximum at the point of perfect order. This “ideal curve” is misleading in the
following sense; a crystal with many defects is just that, ordered and noisy at the same time while
not being a complex system – while being perfectly robust to the end of being completely inflexible
it is not adaptive to signals from the environment. A fractal is a complex pattern because it
has many regularities and symmetries superposed. If natural systems were perfect fractals they
would still cause wonder. The fact that the fractals observed in nature are not perfect is not
the reason that they are considered more complex. Rather, the fact that fractals are generated
under very noisy circumstances illustrates the combination of two goals in a natural systems: The
generation of structure, the more perfect the better, and the robustness of that structure (and
hence its generation mechanism). Clearly, these are opposites and the system needs to optimise
the two. An ideal gas is perfectly robust in its structure simply because it does not have any in
the first place. A crystal is also very robust in its structure but once it is broken it cannot “mend
itself”. A school of fish is very structured though clearly not a perfect grid of fish. But once
4 For a proof consider the following. For a given number of causal states the Statistical Complexity (Eq. 4) has
a unique maximum at uniform probability distribution over the states. This is achieved by a perfectly periodic
sequence with period equal to the number of states. As soon as deviations occur the probability distribution will
likely not be uniform anymore and the Shannon entropy and with it the Statistical Complexity will decrease.
Hence, the Statistical Complexity scores highest for perfectly ordered strings.
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a predator has disturbed the school formation it can then reform immediately. So rather than
requiring a good measure of complexity to have its maximum value for systems which are neither
completely random nor completely ordered this suggests that a measure of order is not sufficient.
A complex system is expected to score high on a measure of order. And it also scores high on a
measure of “adaptivity” (22) or, as Sandra Mitchell calls it, “responsiveness” (35). The latter is
then responsible for the robustness of the order under perturbations and outer influences or, in
other words its ability to correct errors. In the light of this we conclude that the “peaked” form of
complexity functions is not a prerequisite for a measure of complexity but it is a consequence of a
complex system’s adaptiveness while wanting to maintain its structure. Hence, we conclude that
the Statistical Complexity does not measure complexity as such but rather order. But because it
measures order in the presence of noise it can be used to measure the order produced by complex
systems since these systems necessarily exhibit noise.
VI. THE FEATURES OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS REVISITED
A. Necessary and sufficient conditions for complexity
In this section we revisit some of the features of complex systems discussed in Section II and
discuss to what extent they are necessary or sufficient for complexity. We start by giving the
following tentative definition of complexity which we consider as a physical account of complexity:
Complex System (physical account) A complex system is an ensemble of many elements
which are interacting in a disordered way, resulting in robust organisation and memory.
1. Ensemble of many elements
Most definitions or descriptions of complexity mention ‘many elements’ as a characteristic. For
interactions to happen and for pattern and coherence to develop, the elements have to be not only
many but also similar in nature. This is the prerequisite for the condition of interaction. For
systems to be able to interact or communicate (in the broadest sense) with each other they have
to be able to exchange energy or matter or information. Physical systems have to be particles
comparable in size and weight, subject to the same physical laws. In biology, cells before they
form multi-cellular organisms are indistinguishable / identical so they can maximally communicate
(exchange genetic information) with each other. Non-physical systems, e.g. social structures have
to be similar in character, behaviour, or rules obeyed. Other examples are the brain consisting of
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neurones, an ant colony consisting of ants, a financial market consisting of agents. While it is a
necessary condition for a complex system that there are many similar parts of some kind it should
be noted that not all the parts have to be similar and of the same kind. Weather systems are
composed of many similar parts in so far as oxygen, nitrogen and water are all gases composed
of molecules, yet of course these gases are importantly different in their properties and these
differences give rise to important features of the climate. Moreover, weather systems also include
geological features and radiation too. Also weather systems are composed of many similar parts
in so far as there are many small volumes of the atmosphere that are similar and which interact
to give rise to the weather. Furthermore, the hierarchical structure of complex systems reflects a
necessity for some kind of similarity. Ensembles of similar elements at one level form a higher-level
structure which then interacts with other similar higher-level structure. As an example consider a
society. Many cells make up a human body, many human bodies make up a group, many groups
make up a societal structure. Every complex system has at least some parts of which there are
many similar copies interacting. Of course, the idea of a large number of components is vague,
but we note that such vagueness is ubiquitous in the sense that it is vague whether, for example, a
quantum system consists of a large number of particles so that it reduces to classical behaviour in
accordance with the correspondence principle, or whether there are sufficient birds flying together
to be regarded as a flock. 5
2. Interactions
The second condition is for the elements of the system to have the means of interacting. In-
teraction can be either exchange of energy, matter, or information. The mediating mechanism
can be forces, collision or communication. Without interaction a system merely forms a “soup” of
particles which necessarily are independent and have no means of forming patterns, of establishing
order. Here we need to emphasise that interaction needs to be direct, not via a third party, a
so-called common cause. Thus, we require not merely probabilistic dependence but direct depen-
dence. Locality of interaction is not a necessary condition, neither is it sufficient. Interactions
can be channelled through specialised communication and transportation systems. Telephone lines
allow for non-local interactions between agents of a financial market, nerve cells transport chemical
signals over long distances. It is important that the idea of interaction here is not necessarily one
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer whose criticisms based on the example of the climate forced us to clarify
these points.
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of dynamics. What is important is the idea of the dependence of the states of the elements on each
other. Non-linearity of interactions is often mentioned as necessary condition for a complex system.
This claim can be easily refuted. Complex networks, which are clearly complex in their structure
and behaviour, can be defined by matrices which are inherently linear operations. The fact that
non-linearity is not necessary illustrates a commonly mentioned feature of complex systems. They
can be perceived as complicated yet be defined by simple rules, where complicated means difficult
to predict.
3. Disorder
Disorder is a necessary condition for complexity simply because complex systems are precisely
those whose order emerges from disorder rather than being built into them. Interaction is the basis
for any correlations to build up and hence for order to arise from disorder. An example of order
rising out of disorder is thermal fluctuations which are necessary for most biological processes to
take place such as protein binding to DNA which is driven by the energy provided through thermal
fluctuations. The result is the transcription of DNA to make new proteins.
4. Robust order
The above three conditions are all necessary for a complex system to emerge but they are not
sufficient because many similar elements interact in a disorderly way in a gas but they are not
complex systems. However, a system consisting of many similar elements which are interacting in
a disordered way has the potential of forming patterns or structures. An example are the Rayleigh-
Be´nard convection patterns. On an appropriate time scale the order is robust. This means that
although the elements continue to interact in a disordered way the overall patterns and structures
are preserved. A macroscopic level arises out of microscopic interaction and it is stable (on that
time or length scale). This kind of robust order is a further necessary condition for a system to be
complex.
5. Memory
“A system remembers through the persistence of internal structure.”(21)
Memory is a straightforward corollary of robust order.
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B. Statistical Complexity revisited
Since we have come to the conclusion that the Statistical Complexity best captures the qualita-
tive notion of the order produced by a complex system, we offer the following data-driven qualitative
definition of a complex system:
Complex system (data-driven account) A system is complex if it can generate data series
with high Statistical Complexity.
How do the data-driven account of complexity and the physical account of complexity from
Section VI.A represent the features of complex system with which our discussion began, namely,
nonlinearity, feedback, emergence, local organisation, robustness, hierarchical organization, and
numerosity? It is difficult to say how well the Statistical Complexity captures nonlinearity and
feedback. Certainly some systems of high Statistical Complexity are nonlinear and exhibit feed-
back, for instance, see Crutchfield’s investigation into the logistic map (10). However, neither is
necessary or sufficient for high Statistical Complexity. Even strong forms of ontological emergence
are consistent with high Statistical Complexity. However, high Statistical Complexity is also prima
facie compatible with strong forms of ontological reduction of high level phenomena to lower level
phenomena, in which case it would be construed as a useful measure solely for epistemological
purposes. It is not yet clear what, if any, light Statistical Complexity sheds on emergence. There
is an interesting suggestion to define emergence using the predictive efficiency of a process which
is defined in terms of Statistical Complexity (43, p. 9).
As discussed earlier, local organisation and robustness are related, and the former appears nec-
essary for the latter because order that is centrally produced may be easily disrupted by perturbing
the point of control. Locally produced order, on the other hand, involves many distributed copies
which serve as a back ups for each other. A statistically complex system is one that exhibits a
diverse range of behaviour over time i.e. it has many causal states. In contrast a system with no
memory, say a coin being tossed repeatedly, can be modelled accurately with only a single causal
state, and thus has zero Statistical Complexity. Complex systems, unlike a coin toss, must possess
some memory, some record of their past.
Local organisation and robustness appear to be related by this idea of memory; both memory
and robustness involve stability over time, and for this stability we need some form of back-up or
redundancy with which to correct errors. This may be provided when we have a system whose
order is not centrally controlled.
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C. The hierarchical nature of complex systems
We now turn to the underlying architecture – by which we mean the relative organisation of the
elements – which leads to properties such as robustness or de-centralised control. As pointed out by
H. Simon (46), hierarchical organisation involves features which are characteristic of paradigmatic
complex systems.
A system is organised hierarchically when it is composed of subsystems that, in turn, have their
own subsystems, and so on. Many social systems, such as the military, corporations, universities
and legal systems are hierarchies. A university, for example, consists of staff which are grouped in
departments which are grouped in faculties. The highest level of a university is the vice-chancellor
but one can go up the hierarchy even further to networks of universities and so on. It is not
only social systems that exhibit hierarchical organisation. Biological organisms are composed of
systems, organs and cells that are made of nuclei, cell membranes, and mitochondria, etc. The
parts of a cell are made of molecules, which are made of atoms, and so on. Clearly, natural and
social hierarchies are ubiquitous, however, there is an important difference between social and
physical systems in terms of the nature of the hierarchical levels to which we return at the end of
this section.
A core problem in complex systems research is to understand how a complex structure can have
evolved out of a simple one. In particular, if the underlying processes that give rise to evolution
(by which we do not mean biological evolution exclusively) are following a random walk through
the space of possibilities the likelihood of anything complex and hence non-random evolving is neg-
ligible. This mystery of how complexity can evolve is partly explained by hierarchical organisation.
Indeed, ’selective trial and error’ can lead to complex forms on a geologically meaningful time scale.
As Simon points out, in such a “selective” process each intermediate level forms a stable configu-
ration which gets “selected” for further levels to build on top. In this way, the hierarchical nature
of complex systems is explained by the efficiency and stability of hierarchical building processes.
Here, natural evolution and engineering tasks are very similar. Neither would be very successful
if the final product was to be built from scratch every time (recall the above discussion of the
watchmaker). This process of assembling stable intermediates into new stable configurations at a
higher level does not rely upon any particular nature of the subsystems. Hence, the way that stable
intermediates lead to hierarchically organised complex systems is essentially the same for physical,
biological, and social systems. This is why stable democratic states cannot be created overnight;
they need to have a hierarchy of civic structures as well as the high-level democratic processes
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for electing the government. It is apparent that hierarchical architecture and the evolution and
stability of complex systems are intricately linked.
So the robustness of many complex systems arises from the hierarchical process which generates
them and their hierarchical organisation. Many other common features of complex systems can
be similarly explained. The absence of central control, for instance, may also be a consequence
of hierarchical organisation. For example, a cell is composed of molecules which are composed of
atoms etc. Thus, an organism is composed of a multitude of identical particles. None of these has
any particular role at the outset. The particles are equipped with the same interaction forces and
dynamical degrees of freedom. The different levels of the hierarchy are made up of regroupings of
lower levels, of a redefining of the system’s boundaries. Physical systems do not have a central
control because the highest level of the hierarchy is merely the sum of the levels below.
Here we find a general difference between physical or biological systems on the one hand and
social systems on the other that is not mentioned in Simon’s discussion. In a social system an
element at a higher level does not necessarily consist of elements at the level below. The CEO of a
company, for example, does not ‘consist’ of her employees. She is, indeed, a novel central control
element. This being said, many social systems do exhibit complex features. For example, the
stock market is highly complex in the sense that there are many traders interacting, equipped with
buying and selling capacity, and this gives rise to feedback, as in a market panic. The resulting
dynamic is highly unpredictable though and it is often claimed that the market as a whole behaves
like a random walk. Hence, whether or not a company is a complex system in the full sense of the
term is an open question. Although the interactions between many companies make for a good
candidate.
The connection between social and physical hierarchies can be regained to some extent when
we consider the additional element of representation. A head of a political party, for example, not
only controls the party but also represents its members. Social hierarchies can combine to larger
and larger systems through the mechanism of representation. An organisation like the United
Nations could not exist if we didn’t allow for representative governance. There is no such thing
as “representation” in most physical systems and this makes the robust communication between
millions of molecules even more impressive.
The hierarchical architecture of complex systems is linked to the Statistical Complexity as a
measure of a complexity. Crutchfield writes that “[...] a data set is complex if it is the composite
of many symmetries.” (10). A hierarchical structure possesses exactly the architecture which can
generate many symmetries. Such symmetries are, for example, the low- and high-frequencies which
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are associated with the upper and lower levels of the hierarchy, as described by Simon. Thus, the
definition of a complex system as one which has high Statistical Complexity does overlap if not
coincide with the definition of a hierarchy. It is an open question whether any non-hierarchical,
non-engineered structure generates data with high Statistical Complexity.
It is fair to ask how the natural sciences were so successful before they began to take the
hierarchical structure of nature into account. Clearly, physical and not just biological reality is
hierarchical. Subatomic particles form atoms, they in turn form molecules, crystals, condensed
matter and ultimately rocks, planets, solar systems, galaxies, clusters and superclusters. However,
the natural sciences can generate meaningful and predictive theories for higher levels without
knowing much about the lower levels, because often a higher level can be explained with only a
coarse picture of the level underneath it or indeed with no picture at all as with the gas laws and
phenomenological thermodynamics, both of which were developed independently of how we now
understand their microstructural underpinnings. Similarly, the statics and dynamics of fluids and
solids was studied long before the existence of atoms and molecules was known, and an atomic
physicist does not need to know about subatomic particles to master her field.
However, in contemporary science, understanding the levels above and below is becoming more
and more important to the science of a particular level. Many of the phenomena now studied in the
natural and social sciences are beyond the scope of any one discipline. For example, understanding
human diseases requires knowledge of the physics of electromagnetism, the chemistry of molecular
bonding, the biology of cellular organisms, and the psychology of the human mind. Hence, the
increasing success of complex systems research shows that our scientific knowledge has reached the
point where we are able to put pieces together that we had previously been gathering separately.
Complexity science contributes to and is only possible because of the unity of science.
VII. CONCLUSION
The right measure of the order exhibited by complex systems must be computable and not be
maximal for randomness. Crutchfield’s Statistical Complexity has these features, and is also in
other ways illustrative of a good complexity measure. Inferring the minimal -machine from a data
sequence means identifying some form of pattern or structure, statistical or deterministic in the
data. It is time to raise an important philosophical issue for complexity science, or, indeed, any
scientific theory, namely the question of realism versus instrumentalism. What are the prospects
for adopting a realist position toward the patterns represented by -machines as opposed to the
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view, say, that the patterns are merely useful tools for predicting the system’s behaviour but not
real features of the world?
In nature patterns are everywhere: the familiar arrow-head flight formation of geese; bees which
assemble honeycomb into an hexagonal tessellation; the spiral formations of sunflowers and galaxies.
Cicadas of the genus magicicada exhibit the interesting temporal pattern that their life-cycles are
prime numbers of years to avoid synchrony with potential predators’ lifecycles. The scientific study
of naturally occurring patterns requires both a suitable means for formally representing patterns
and a method of inferring patterns from data that picks out objective features of the world. The
reconstruction of -machines meets the former challenge by representing patterns via the smallest
computational model capable of statistically reproducing them. The latter challenge is an instance
of the classic problem of natural kinds articulated by Plato:
. . . [T]o be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints,
and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.(5, 542)
Patterns are doubly challenging for the scientific realist because not only are physical theories
concerning patterns subject to the usual anti-realist arguments (namely the pessimistic meta-
induction, the underdetermination argument and so on), but also all examples of patterns, such as
the ones given above, are dependent on the existence of some underlying matter to exhibit them
so there is always the objection that all that really exists is the matter not the pattern. A related
but stronger motivation for antirealism about the patterns studied by the complexity sciences
is reductionism. The reductionist begins with the plausible premise that the causal power of a
high level phenomenon, say a brick, is nothing over and above the sum of its micro constituents’
causal powers. Next she argues that only those objects whose causal interactions are necessary
to produce the observed phenomena should be regarded as the real ones. The conclusion is that
bricks and windows are superfluous causal terms in our explanation of observed phenomena. In
other words, all phenomena arise from the low level knocking about of objects, and these are the
only objects one needs to take to exist. An example of this strategy is eliminative materialism in
the philosophy of mind, which seeks to replace folk-psychological discourse about minds, beliefs
and emotions etc. with neuroscientific discourse about neural activity within the central nervous
system. Contemporary metaphysics has also employed causal exclusion arguments against higher
level phenomena, taking atomic collisions and suchlike as paradigm causal mediators and leading
some authors (34) to dismiss talk of baseballs breaking windows, on the grounds that what really
does the interacting are the brick’s and the window’s microstructures. Higher level phenomena
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such as bricks and windows are redundant causal terms and we are urged to view them as merely
predictively useful abstractions, that is, we are urged to be instrumentalists about bricks and
windows.
So how might we justify a realist attitude towards patterns? The most promising approach pio-
neered by Daniel Dennett in his paper “Real Patterns” (11) and endorsed in one form or another by
David Wallace (49) and James Ladyman and Don Ross (2007 )(27) is to appeal to the remarkable
amount of computational effort saved at the expense of very little predictive power when adopting
a theory of patterns. Consider Wallace’s example: suppose we are interested in predicting the
movements of a tiger when hunting its prey; one approach would be to model the entire tiger,
prey, environment system on the sub-atomic level and study its dynamics according the laws of
quantum mechanics, since quantum mechanics is by far the most accurately verified physical theory
ever devised we should be confident our predictions will be highly accurate. This strategy is obvi-
ously completely impractical because there is no realistic hope of obtaining an accurate quantum
mechanical description of the entire system let alone computing its time evolution. Ascending to a
higher level, we may view the tiger and its prey as biological systems and attempt to predict their
behaviour through our understanding of biochemistry and neuroscience. This approach is vastly
simpler than the previous approach but still way beyond our practical reach. Notice also that some
accuracy will have been sacrificed. Highly improbable quantum fluctuations simply do not occur
in the biological picture but this loss of accuracy is overwhelmingly insignificant in comparison to
the reduction of the computational complexity of modelling the situation. Ascending to the even
higher level of animal-psychology we have again compromised on predictive accuracy since the fine
details of the individuals will not be modeled. However, as before this small loss in predictive
power is more than compensated for by now having a tractable means for accurately predicting
how the situation will play out. To quote Wallace’s slogan:
A tiger is any pattern which behaves as a tiger.(49, 7)
This sounds like realism: tigers exist and they are anything that behaves like a tiger. However
the discussion so far has been distinctly instrumentalist in tone reporting how ascending to higher
levels serves to increase our practical predictive capacity.
To sum up:
1. We are pursuing a realist account of patterns in the physical world.
2. It is noted that some patterns allow for an enormous simplification of our model of reality
while trading off relatively little predictive power.
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3. Identifying patterns via their predictive utility is suggestive of an instrumentalist and anti-
realist approach. How can a pattern’s predictive utility be given ontological weight?
The beginnings of a theory to answer the latter question were given by Dennett (11) and refined
by Ross (41) and Ladyman (27) resulting in an ontological account of patterns called Rainforest
Realism. The main thesis is that since computation is a physical process there is a determinate
matter of fact about whether a pattern is predictively useful, namely, if it is possible to build a
computer to accurately simulate the phenomena in question by means of said pattern, and if doing
so is much more computationally efficient than operating at a lower level and ignoring the pattern.
Since computation is a physical process, it is the laws of physics which determine whether such and
such a computation can occur and hence whether a given pattern is real. Crutchfield and Shalizi
prove in Section 5 of (42) that -machines are the unique, optimal predictors of the phenomena
they are meant to model.
Our first theorem showed that the causal states are maximally prescient; our second,
that they are the simplest way of representing the pattern of maximum strength; our
third theorem, that they are unique in having this double optimality. Further results
showed that -machines are the least stochastic way of capturing maximum-strength
patterns and emphasized the need to employ the efficacious but hidden states of the
process, rather than just its gross observables, such as sequence blocks.(42, 853)
The claim is that the patterns inferred and represented by -machines are the simplest, most
accurate means for predicting the behaviour of the system they describe. According to rainforest
realism it must be possible to construct a computer capable of simulating the phenomena under
investigation by means of some pattern, in this case an -machine, in order for the pattern to be real.
We know that in the vast majority of cases this will be possible. -machines are typically members
of a simple class of computers such as finite state automata and we know from daily experience
that we are adept at building computing devices capable of simulating these, namely, desktop
computers. So long as we have enough memory, energy and time to run our computer the pattern
described by the simulation is an objective feature of the simulated phenomena. The process of
inferring -machines does indeed identify real patterns. Rainforest realism, despite its emphasis on
the predictive utility of patterns, avoids instrumentalism through a criterion of pattern reality –
the possibility or otherwise of such and such a computing device – whose truth is determined by
objective facts about the physical world.
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